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Torts-The Law of the Mixed Societyt
Guido Calabresi*
Most of the other participants in this festschrift have been person-
ally associated with Dean Leon Green as students, colleagues, and
friends. They have benefited directly from his extraordinary intellect
and personality. It is no wonder that they have contributed to this issue.
My first serious discussion with Dean Green took place just a few
months ago. Yet such is the nature of Dean Green's scholarly achieve-
ments that, as a torts teacher nearly half a century his junior, I could
view him as my teacher, colleague, and friend long before I met him. It
is particularly fitting, then, that I participate in honoring Dean Green,
for when I write I represent not only myself, but countless other un-
known students, colleagues, and friends, past and yet to come. On their
behalf as well as my own, I gratefully dedicate this article to him.
Losses are best left on the victims. Only if it can clearly be shown
that injurers could have cheaply avoided the loss-were at
fault-should incentives to avoid injury rest on them.1 And even when
injurers can readily choose the safer path, the victim should frequently
still bear the loss and the incentive to avoid it.2 That this allocation
t This article stems from a lecture delivered at the Bicentennial Conference held at the New
York University School of Law, April 27-30, 1976. The written version of that lecture was pub-
lished in AMERICAN LAW: THE TiiRD CENTURY 103-20 (B. Schwartz, ed. 1976). Reprinted by
permission. Copyright 1976, New York University.
* John Thomas Smith Professor of Law, Yale University. B.S. 1953, LL.B. 1958, Yale Uni-
versity; M.A. 1959, Oxford University; M.A. 1962, Yale University.
1. Fault implies not only that injurers can cheaply avoid the loss, but also that they either
know or should have known this. For a twentieth century definition of fault that attempted to
state systematically the relationships involved, see Conway v. O'Brien, Ill F.2d 611, 612 (2d Cir.
1940) (Hand, L., J.), rev'don other grounds, 312 U.S. 492 (1941). See also United States v. Carrol
Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947); Terry, Negligence, 29 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1915).
2. Diverse, often self-contradictory, reasons were given in the high days of the fault system
to explain why in many instances victims should bear losses despite the availability of a "faulty"
injurer. Some of these were consistent with the goal of efficient reduction of accident costs; some
were not. Perhaps the two most important were contributory negligence (which treated victim
fault, and by implication the possibility of injury avoidance by victims, as a different order of
things from injurer fault and avoidance) and proximate cause (which had the effect of leaving the
burden of avoidance on innocent victims--those of whom it could not be said that they ought to
have avoided harm-rather than placing it on injurers who, by definition, could and should have
avoided the harm). Imputed contributory negligence, intra-family immunities and, most dramati-
cally, assumption of risk went in some ways even further in establishing a system in which, even
where injurer precautions were feasible and cheap, the incentive to avoid the harm often rested on
the victim. I have expressed this view of the fault system more fully in various recent writings. See
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places all unavoidable losses, as well as the cost of avoiding many
avoidable losses, on those activities or social classes that give rise to
victims, is either irrelevant or beneficial from a wealth distribution
standpoint.
3
These related notions were nearing the high point of acceptance in
1876 and yet the first signs of a reversal were already discernible,
though perhaps only to those with hindsight.4 Typically, for this is
common law and not nature, the tide had started to turn even though it
had not yet quite reached its high point. Today, one could state the
same propositions substituting victims for injurers and injurers for vic-
tims throughout and approach the way in which most commentators
and many courts would describe tort law.
Given this recent history, it would be foolhardy to predict how the
curious mixture of desire to reduce injuries and to favor certain wealth
categories that we call tort law, and quickly describe in the language of
justice,5 will develop in the next century. Too much depends on the
generally Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts, 43 U. CHI. L. REv. 69 (1975); Cala-
bresi, Optimal Deterrence andAccidents, 84 YALE L.J. 656 (1975); Calabresi & Hirschoff, Towarda
Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055 (1972).
3. It would be irrelevant if one believes that efficient accident avoidance, through the place-
ment of the incentive to avoid on the appropriate party, is more important than what categories
are made richer or poorer. "Efficiency" might be short run (minimizing the sum of accident costs
and safety costs); it might include administrative costs (avoiding unnecessary costs of shifting);
and it might even include long run cost avoidance (giving a subsidy to new industries whose
development would benefit "injurer" and "victim" categories alike, at least in the long, long run
when, unfortunately, all those now present might long since be beyond benefiting). The allocation
of losses described in the text might be viewed as beneficial from a purely distributional stand-
point if one believes that injurers, as a category, are "worthier" than victims as a category. Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. certainly believed in the efficiency reasons for normally burdening victims
(even though he accepted some very limited non-fault injurer liability). Whether he believed that
such allocations were also distributionally beneficial is less clear. He clothed his undoubted pref-
erence for victim loss bearing in language that can be read to rely either on long run efficiency or
on worthiness. See, e.g., 0. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 76-77 (M. Howe ed. 1963). Cf. G. CALA-
BRESi, THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 261-63 (1970) (criticism of
Holmes efficiency justification) [hereinafter cited as THE CosTs OF ACCIDENTS]. See also Cala-
bresi & Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and lnalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85
HARv. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
4. In 1876 Rylands v. Fletcher had already been decided and one can, with hindsight, see at
least in Justice Blackburn's opinion, the seeds of ultrahazardous activity, non-fault, injurer liabil-
ity. Other opinions, however, make the case seem like a last bastion of a pre-fault approach,
preserved for a particular category of victims, the landed gentry. See Fletcher v. Rylands, 3 H. &
C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 737 (1865), rev'd, L.R. I Ex. 265 (1866), ajf'a L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868). Only
with hindsight can we say that Blackburn's approach was to prove more important than Baron
Bramwell's or Lord Cairns'.
Clearer signs of reversal can be seen in some statutes dealing with liability of railroads for
fire. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-177 (1975), enacted in 1875 (injury suffices to establish a
prima facie case of negligence), followed by CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-175 (1975), enacted in 1881
(negligence no longer needed for liability), and upheld against a constitutional challenge in Gris-
sell v. Housatonic R.R. Co., 54 Conn. 447, 9 A. 137 (1886).
5. This is not the place to go into the relationship between efficiency and distributional
desires and justice. That results which can be analyzed with some success in terms of their effi-
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industrial structure of society.6 And what that will be in the next hun-
dred years I happily, but not confidently, leave to the economists. Yet,
even if one abstains from attempting that most intriguing of guesses, if
one refuses to try to figure out who in what areas will bear unavoidable
losses and, hence, the incentive and burden of avoiding most avoidable
losses, something can still be said about tort law and the next century.
Tort law and more particularly the rule of liability is, I submit, the
paradigmatic law of the mixed society. The purely "liberal," laissez-
faire polity prefers contracts, the truly collective state the criminal sanc-
tion; tort law lies in between. That torts has always been present and
significant, that it is so today in the so-called "people's democracies,"
are testimonies to the fact that purely "liberal" and purely collective
systems exist solely in the minds of theoreticians and ideologues. The
world knows better. That the role of torts has changed testifies to the
fact that not all mixtures are the same and in some times and places
individual atomistic choices dominate the blend, while at others collec-
tive decisions control.
Why do I say that tort law is the law of the mixed society? Let us
spend a few minutes examining how injuries would be approached by
ideologically pure states. It will help us see why the approach of tort
law is, at a minimum, the compromise that the ideologue must make
with reality, and at a maximum the preferred choice of the ideologi-
cally skeptical and of those whose ideology is skepticism.
A purely collectivistic society would approach each situation or
activity which has injury-causing potential in a way that would leave
ciency and distributional effects are commonly, and often quite properly, described by courts and
commentators in justice terms is a commonplace. Sometimes the use of justice language can be
helpful (for one brief explanation see Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts, supra
note 2, at 105-108). At other times justice language can serve mainly to obfuscate; a particularly
egregious example is Ives v. South Buffalo Ry., 201 N.Y. 271, 94 N.E. 431 (1911).
Among recent attempts to explain tort law in terms of justice language, the most interesting
include Epstein, Intentional Harms, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 391 (1975); Epstein, Defenses and Subse-
quent Pleas in a System of Strict Liability, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1974); Epstein, A Theory of Strict
Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); Epstein, Pleadings and Presumptions, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
556 (1973); Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972).
6. In a society where unions do not exist or are small and disorganized, the placement of
industrial accident costs on the employer-injurer, rather than on the employee-victim, is likely to
lead to a greater recognition of accident costs and to greater incentives toward accident avoidance.
(The individual worker is not as likely to know and evaluate the risk as is the employer for whom
such harms are a statistic.) In a society in which both unions and employers are large enough to
treat industrial accidents as a statistically "known" risk, the legal placement of the cost burden is
unlikely to have any great significance. (It will be renegotiated by the parties either openly or
through wage rate changes.) In a society where unions are large and employers small and scat-
tered, greater incentives to safety are likely to result from placement of initial losses on the union-
ized employees, at least absent compulsory employer insurance. (The employers are less likely
than the unions to know the precise extent of the risk; many may choose to "chance it" and go
under.)
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no room for tort law. A judgment would be made whether a particular
act or activity engaged in at a particular time in a particular way by
particular people is too dangerous to be permitted, or alternatively is
desirable despite its risks; If an act is deemed too dangerous it would be
forbidden and a penalty sufficiently severe to deter it would be im-
posed whenever it occurred and regardless of whether in the specific
instance "harm" to victims occurred. The act-it might be driving by
people below a certain age, or driving at all, or driving between certain
hours-would have been deemed wrongful and punished accordingly
by the criminal law. If instead, the act was not wrong, then, even if
harm resulted, there would be no purpose in burdening the doer of the
act (whether injurer or victim) with the damages. The act was deemed
worth doing despite its risks when judged from a collectivistic, societal
point of view and the harms, if any, like the benefits, would be borne
by the society.7 If consistent, that is, ideologically pure, the collectivistic
nonmarket society would handle damages collectively. These, like all
the ills that can befall one, would be socially insured and paid out of
the general coffers of the state.
Such a society would handle enterpreneurial activities analo-
gously. No one could start a shoe factory-under penalty of
law-unless such a factory were deemed collectively desirable, in
which case such a factory would be mandated. If harm to some previ-
ously made investment resulted or if the shoe factory turned out to be a
mistake, that would be the state's worry. Conversely, if the factory was
as, or more, beneficial than expected, the benefit would also be the
state's. Risk taking would exist (because the collective society cannot
destroy risk any more than can the liberal atomistic society) but the
benefits and harms-the profits and losses--of risk taking would ac-
crue to the state to be parcelled out among its citizens according to its
prevailing notions of appropriate distribution of wealth.
What we think of as the province of tort law, injury-causing activ-
ity, is but one kind of risk taking and would be handled in the same
way. Accordingly, risky behavior would either be forbidden and sub-
7. An "act," as I am using the word, is simply a subcategory of an "activity." For that reason
a collective decision to deter an activity only "to iome extent" or when done by "some people" or
in "certain ways" can be described as a decision fully to deter some acts.
It does not matter, for these purposes, what the governmental structure of the collectivistic
society is. It might be democratic and governed by elected individuals who can be voted out if
they do not choose in accordance with popular desires. It might be dictatorial-of the proletariat
or otherwise. What is crucial is that the decision makers-however chosen-are expected to decide
for the mass of the people which risks are worth taking and which, instead, are not.
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ject to criminal law sanctions, or required and socially insured. Either
way civil liability rules and damages would have no place.
That such a purely collective society is unworkable (and would to
my way of thinking be extremely undesirable) I will pass over for the
moment. The same is true of its converse, the purely atomistic or mar-
ket society, at which I would now like to look.
The atomistic market society would establish starting points, "enti-
tlements," based on its views of what wealth distribution is desirable
and on its guesses as to what starting points could make contracts and
transactions least costly. Once these starting points had been estab-
lished, it would forbid nothing except what I shall call noncontractual
behavior. That is, it would prohibit the taking of anyone else's entitle-
ments; it would permit, indeed enforce, all consensual transfers of enti-
tlements, and except for (a) determining these-unavoidably
collective-starting points, (b) requiring agreement by the parties as a
precondition to the transfer of entitlements, and (c) enforcing all con-
tracts representing such agreements, the state would play no role.8
The "entitlements" would establish who would bear a harm if it
occurred-that is, who would be the initial risk bearers. Risky behavior
would then be handled in one of two ways. If the harm fell on the party
whom the starting point had burdened, it would stay there-unless an
"indemnity" or "insurance" contract had been entered into with an-
other party who willingly, and presumably for a price, had undertaken
to bear the risk. (Such contracts would not, of course, be required.) If
instead the harm initially fell on a party not originally burdened with
8. I have elsewhere said that the market society would (apart from distributional con-
siderations) establish entitlements so as to put the burden of accidents on that activity which can
avoid accidents most cheaply. See, e.g., G. CALABREsI, THE CosTs oF ACCIDENTS, supra note 3;
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3. That statement may seem inconsistent with the one made
here. But it is not, for included in the definition of the cheapest cost avoider was the ability to
negotiate cheaply and, by implication, to establish contracts that could be enforced cheaply. Con-
versely, placement of the initial burden on the party who could, literally, avoid the harm most
cheaply, would also entail that placement which would make contracts and transactions least
costly. For such a placement would obviate the need for any transactions or contracts with respect
to that risk, and hence reduce such costs to zero. Where there is sufficient uncertainty about the
identity of the cheapest cost avoider, however, the party that seems most able to alter its behavior
cheaply may not be the party that seems most able to negotiate cheaply. In such cases a judgment
must be made, based on the particular facts, as to which ability offers the greatest promise of
reducing the sum of the costs of accidents and of their avoidance.
The collectively determined starting points are frequently described by advocates of a pure
market society as based on a series of essentially utilitarian judgments. These are collective judg-
ments of utility, however. Ironically, once such collective utilitarian judgments have been made,
the pure market ideology permits changes only on the basis of atomistic, libertarian-contractarian
utility judgments, ie., only free market transactions are permissible means to further utility im-
provements. See notes 10 & I1 infra. See also Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57
AM. EcoN. REV. 347 (1967).
523
HeinOnline -- 56 Tex. L. Rev.  523 1977-1978
Texas Law Review Vol. 56: 519, 1978
the risk, the other party would be bound to pay the damages. But the
damages would not be collectively determined; they would be arrived
at contractually. The original risk bearer would only be permitted to
engage in the dangerous activity if he had either purchased from the
victim the right to inflict the loss (an exculpatory agreement) or agreed
ahead of time with the victim on the compensation to be paid if harm
occurred (contractual compensation schedule), or agreed with him on a
procedure to determine, after the event, the damages to be paid (arbi-
tration agreement).9 Such contracts would be mandatory (a require-
ment that would be enforced penally), for only through them could the
atomistic market society be assured that, within its ideology, a benefi-
cent shifting of the risk had occurred. 10
9. The analogy to liquidated damages and to resolution of commercial disputes through
arbitration is obvious and intended. From this point of view, the limitations placed by contract
law in some jurisdictions on liquidated damages and on arbitration agreements "in derogation of
law" are deviations from the pure market ideal. They, like all restrictions on the legal ability of
one of the parties to take on risks by contract, smack of tort law and represent "mixed society"
incursions into the very citadel of the market. The expansion of old, and proliferation of new,
constraints on the ability to contract (whether because the result would violate public policy, be
unconscionable or what have you) are part of the ascendancy of the liability rule-
torts-approach that I am describing in this paper. I do not, however, wish to be taken to suggest
that contract law ever represented pure market ideology. Specific performance and promissory
estoppel are but two examples of contract doctrines whose relationship to pure market ideology is
at best uncertain. Because contract law was not as brittle as market ideologues would have had it
be, it has been able to survive the decline of that ideology. See also notes 17 & 24 infra.
10. The ideology of the market society is premised on the notion that-absent unanimous
societal consent-an improvement from any given starting point can be shown to occur only if an
individual or group freely transacts with another individual or group to bring about a change.
Such a move leads to what is termed a Pareto-superior position, and the parties are by definition
better off; by defimition because the pure market ideology premises that individuals always know
best for themselves what they want and what will better their state. There is no need to go into the
host of practical and theoretical limitations of this approach, many accepted by strong free market
advocates. It is enough for us here to note that unless the parties agree before the accident on the
compensation to be paid for bearing a loss or for bearing its risk, in derogation of the initial
entitlement, the free exchange of rights mandated by the market ideology will not exist. A collec-
tive determination of the loss, that is, tort damages, or eminent domain compensation for that
matter, does not constitute an agreement by the parties to sell and buy an entitlement for the price
that suits them. As such it may over or under compensate and hence does not necessarily leave
both parties-still presumed to know best for themselves---better off than before. There will be
some losers-e.g., those who would not have sold at the eminent domain price-and the change
cannot be shown to constitute a Pareto-superior move. Unlike "legal compensation," an agree-
ment (before an accident) on the procedure to be used for determining damages (after an accident)
does meet the requirements of the market ideology. Once again since the parties "knew best for
themselves" when they accepted the procedure, they by definition are fully compensated through
that procedure. The analogy is to a free sale of a good at a price to be determined later by an
expert chosen by the parties.
Any attempt (through "social contract theory" or by implying consent) to convert state de-
termination of tort damages into such an "agreed upon procedure" proves too much, however.
The same "consent" can be implied for any state action, and Pareto-superiority can then be
claimed for any state-made collective decision. The term, at that point, loses all significance and
.. . utility. See generally J. BUCHANAN, THE LIMIrS OF LIBERTY (1975); J. BUCHANAN & G.
TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LEGAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOC-
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To state either of the two "pure approaches" is to deny the possi-
bility of using them universally. Can any society, however collectivistic,
as a practical matter decide whether each and every act is undesirable,
and hence forbidden, or worth doing, and hence required? It would be
manifestly impossible. Conversely, can any society require that before
a person engages in an act he contract with all those potentially harmed
by it? One need only think of the automobile driver seeking out and
contracting with all possible victims to recognize the impossibility of
the approach. Of course, if victims were chosen to bear allrisk initially,
total atomism would be possible. Such a starting point-essentially a
might makes right entitlement-is not logically impossible. But no at-
omistic laissez-faire society can, in fact, tolerate it. Total risk bearing by
victims would neither avoid injuries cheaply (be efficient) nor result in
an acceptable wealth distribution (be fair). At its extreme it would en-
tail no property or bodily integrity. Those we now call thieves or mur-
derers or rapists could steal or injure to their hearts' content. The
victims could be safe only by buying protection. No, the market society
cannot be indifferent to who bears the initial risk of harm resulting
from the behavior of others. It cares, both for efficiency and distribu-
tional-not to say justice-reasons about the placement of the initial
entitlements, and it cares even when contracting before the injury is not
feasible; hence the market society can no more exist in its "pure" form
than can its converse, the purely collective society. I I
RACY (1962); Buchanan, Positive Economics, We/fare Economics, and Political Economy, 2 J. LAW
& ECON. 124 (1959).
All this emphasizes the too-often-ignored difference between a pure utilitarian ideology and
a pure libertarian-contractarian one. The first would have no problems with collectively deter-
mined shifts in entitlements and, afortior4 with collectively determined compensation, so long as
it appeared that winners gained more than losers lost. The second rejects such shifts unless the
gains, losses, and compensation are demonstrated through freely established contractual-market
transactions. See note 8 supra.
11. The tension between the utilitarian bases of free market thinking (whether collective or
not) and the libertarian-contractarian aspirations of that ideology are all too rarely recognized
explicitly. But see J. BUCHANAN, supra note 10.
In the absence of what Professor Coase has called transaction costs, any initial allocation is
as efficient as any other. But transaction costs (as the term is used by Coase, to mean any impedi-
ments to bargaining including absence of information and knowledge) are-like friction-only
absent in theoretical models. The question then inevitably becomes how significant in any given
situation is "the friction." Where impediments to bargaining (transaction costs) are significant, the
initial entitlement can be crucial in terms of efficiency. See Calabresi, Transaction Costs, Resource
Allocation andLiability Rules, 11 J. LAW & ECON. 67 (1968); Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3;
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. LAW & ECON. 1 (1960). And a laissez-faire society knows
this as well as any other. Indeed, the efficiency basis of the nineteenth century's preference for
victim loss bearing lay precisely in the existence of transaction costs. Injurers could not seek out
and contract with all possible victims. When, nevertheless, injurer avoidance seemed patently
cheaper, efficiency, given the presence of transaction costs, required that the initial burden be
placed on injurers. A simple "always let the loss lie on the victim" was, therefore, unacceptable to
these utilitarian nineteenth century free marketeers and liability for many fault caused injuries
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But if to describe the two pure approaches is to deny the possibility
of their universal application, it is also to recognize how frequently
both are in fact used in their pure forms in all societies to deal with
particular problems or segments of problems. Even a cursory look at
traditional situations close to tort law in which behavior is forbidden
(driving by infants) or-for it is the same thing-is required (driving
with lights after dark) demonstrates that collective approaches have al-
ways had their due. When one moves to those areas that have tradition-
ally been "criminal" the spectrum of collective controls, of course,
broadens still further. Conversely, even in traditional tort areas, there
has always been a place for contracts that shifted the risk onto a party
initially protected from it. And again, as one moves away from tradi-
tional tort areas to those we think of as governed by contract or sales
law, one sees how frequently the pure atomistic approach is used. Theft
(noncontractual behavior) is forbidden, but by contract it can become a
valid sale.'2
We can conclude that legal systems generally employ mixed col-
lective and atomistic approaches. We can also see that the simplest
mixture involves using both of the pure approaches but limiting their
scope. Some acts are forbidden or required, a fact that neither contrac-
tual arrangements nor payment of damages will alter. Other acts are
permitted without sanction but only if contractual behavior precedes
the action or ratifies it after the event.
This simple mixture does not suffice, however. Too often neither
pure approach is acceptable. The atomistic approach is rejected for one
of two reasons:
a) contractual behavior is too expensive to be required
before action;' 3 or
followed. See also Demsetz, When Does the Rule of Liability Matter, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972);
Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: .A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 1
(1972); notes 8 & 10 supra.
12. To say that illegitimate noncontractual behavior can become valid through a contract or
sale is not to say that a society must always permit all contracts. Rape, by contract, can become
prostitution-a very different thing, but not necessarily legal. Murder cannot be made legal
through victim consent. All such restrictions on contract are, in a sense, limits on the "pure"
market society, though many were recognized even in the high days of that ideology. Some restric-
tions on alienation can in fact be explained in terms that are, on the whole, consistent with "pure"
markets in the "real" world. As such restrictions become more widespread, however, explanations
inconsistent with market ideologies become more plausible. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note
3.
13. Any time initial injurer liability is appropriate, and finding and contracting with al possi-
ble victims is impossible, a clear instance of this first reason exists. Negligent driving is the classic
example. Burdening injurers was widely deemed to be appropriate; ex ante contractual arrange-
'ments with possible victims were prohibitive; fault-based tort liability followed. A somewhat more
complex example of the first reason is the ease in which contractual behavior harms "third" par-
ties with whom contractual arrangements are not feasible.
526
Vol. 56: 519, 1978
HeinOnline -- 56 Tex. L. Rev.  526 1977-1978
Law of the Mixed Society
b) the society does not trust the parties to contract in their
own best interest.
14
But the collective approach is also rejected for either of two analogous
reasons:
a) it costs too much collectively to decide on, and enforce
controls on all behavior; or
b) the society is not sure enough about the desirability of the
behavior to wish to require or forbid it.
Where either reason for rejecting pure market controls joins with either
reason for rejecting collective controls, one is apt to find the torts ap-
proach in one of its many forms.
Note that each set of two reasons for rejecting a pure approach
contains an ideological ground (lack of faith in the ability either of the
atomistic contract or of the collective decision to achieve desired re-
sults) and a practical reason (contractual behavior is costly, but so are
collective decisions). Obviously the more a society is ideologicaly pure,
the more it will employ torts only when using its favored "pure" system
is not feasible, ie., is too costly. The nineteenth century tended to em-
ploy torts only when letting losses lie on victims was manifestly ineffi-
cient or distributionally intolerable, and when requiring possible
injurers to engage in contractual behavior before acting mandated the
impossible and precluded potentially desirable activities. Skepticism as
to people's ability to contract in their own best interest was only rarely
a basis for torts. Conversely, a truly collective society uses torts only
when it wishes to be freed of the costs of deciding the desirability of
every minute action, not because it wishes to let individuals decide-to
some extent-whether an action is worth doing. The ideologically skep-
tical society, instead, will use torts even when pure approaches are fea-
sible, precisely because it is skeptical of the desirability both of pure
contractual behavior and of collective decisions.
What then is the mixture I have been calling torts and which in
Europe is more felicitously called "civil responsibility"? Its essence is
the liabili&y rule which itself mixes individualistic and collective deci-
14. This second reason may be present because the parties do not have adequate knowledge
to contract in their own best interests. And making such knowledge available in an effetive way
may not be deemed feasible or may be prohibitively expensive. For a discussion of what is an
adequate warning or disclaimer, even in contractual situations like those involved in products
liability cases, see Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Henningsen
v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
It may also be present because the society believes that the parties, even if informed, will not
decide in their best interests since they are incapable as a result of age, poverty, lack of education,
or any other "limitation" that seems crucial to that no longer purely individualistic society.
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sions. Behavior is not collectively forbidden merely because it is risky
or required despite its risks. Individuals are free to choose, but their
choice entails civil liability, that is, the payment of collectively deter-
mined damages if harm occurs. 15 Conversely, contractual behavior to
purchase the right to harm those entitled not to be harmed is not re-
quired. 16 Again, the payment of collectively determined compensation
to those injured takes its place.
The ideology that underlies use of liability rules is a mixed ideol-
ogy. The party entitled to be free from harm is not compensated to the
degree or in the way that he might have chosen. He has not sold his
entitlement for a price satisfactory to him; it has been taken from him
and he is given damages, which may be greater or less than what he
would have negotiated for, but which are, in any event, decided upon
collectively.' 7 Conversely, decisions on the desirability of engaging in
risky activities are not made collectively. They are left up to individuals
who will, presumably, be influenced by the damages they may have to
pay or bear if harm occurs.' 8
15. The behavior may also be forbidden criminally, as is the case in many automobile negli-
gence situations, but that additional bit of collective intervention is for my present purposes beside
the point. To the extent that civil responsibility or liability exists, the actor must take that possi-
ble-collectively determined-payment into account in deciding whether the behavior is worth
undertaking. It might seem that damages in contract cases are also collectively determined. But if
the parties to the contract had the option, at the time the contract was made, of agreeing to liqui-
dated damages or to arbitration and chose not to do so, then judicial damages would be fully
consistent with the libertarian ideology. See note 10 supra. If arbitration and liquidated damages
are forbidden, however, the approach is closer to that of the ideology mixture I am here describ-
ing. See note 9 sufpra & note 17 infra.
16. As a general rule, it is not forbidden. Exculpatory agreements exist, as do agreements to
let damages-should harm occur-be determined by arbitrators chosen by the parties. Such "con-
tractual behavior," however, even if permitted, is not a prerequisite for acting.
17. Tort law is only one instance of this ideological mixture; it is only one area in which what
I call liability rules are used. Eminent domain is another, for in that area too a transfer of an
entitlement is imposed at a price that is not negotiated by the parties. Closely analogous are
prohibitions on particular means of assessing damages agreed to by the parties. Thus, from the
point of view of this paper, restrictions on the use of liquidated damage clauses or of arbitration
agreements are examples of the same mixed approach of which torts is my paradigm. Moving a bit
further, but still close, is the unenforceability of certain contracts as "against public policy" or as
"unconscionable." The analogue here, of course, is to the invalidity of certain exculpatory or
indemnificatory agreements and the "inadequacy" of some warnings in torts. In all these instances
there is substituted for the "agreement" of the parties a collective determination. But also in these
instances, the collective determination does not cover the field; it leaves substantial room for indi-
vidual decisions and for the play of incentives. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3.
18. One could, of course, look at criminal law and criminal penalties analogously. From this
viewpoint the penalty becomes the price that the criminal is free to risk and, if caught, pay in
order to engage in the- criminal behavior. Those who have looked at criminal law this way are,
understandably, led to take the next step; in attempting to convert that area of law into a torts-like
mixture they frequently urge fines or victim compensation instead of more traditional criminal
sanctions. See, e.g., Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169
(1968); Del Vecchio, Equality and Inequality in Relation to Justice, 11 NAT. L.F. 36, 43-45 (1966).
See also R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 66-69, 357-73 (1972).
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If ideologically mixed, liability rules are also intensely practical.
They enable actions to take place when contractual behavior, before
harm, would not be feasible. Damages after harm replace such unfeasi-
ble agreements. And they permit control of behavior that could only at
too great an expense be governed collectively. By varying the size of the
applicable damages according to the various circumstances involved,
the collective decision makers can go a long way toward enforcing their
views without engaging in minutiae of control that would not be worth-
while.
We are now, finally, in a position to talk briefly about the future of
torts-about the next hundred years. That future depends fundamen-
tally on the degree to which our society will be relatively pure ideologi-
cally-and use torts mainly out of necessity (as a hundred years ago),
or will continue to be ideologically skeptical (as it is now)--and opt for
But this approach, to my way of thinking, misperceives the societal judgment involved in
criminal law. Leaving aside ambiguous areas like parking tickets and other "administrative" vio-
lations (which are in fact normally subject only to fines), the societal intention in criminal law is
not to permit individuals to choose whether or not committing the crime is worthwhile. The ob-
ject, though never fully enforceable, is to keep the crime from happening regardless of the crimi-
nal's desire to commit it because a collective decision has been made that the criminal conduct is
not worthwhile regardless of individual desire to engage in it.
This collective determination is easily reconcilable with a market ideology whenever negoti-
ations between the victim and the criminal are eminently feasible. Indeed, the criminality in such
cases can be viewed as consisting simply in the willful refusal on the part of the criminal to engage
in contractual behavior before acting. Theft is the most obvious case; criminal sanctions are im-
posed in order to require a negotiated sale rather than a taking at a collectively determined "price-
penalty" (as Becker would have it). Rape, when prostitution is permitted or in practice tolerated, is
another. Ideologically, traditional criminal sanctions in these areas can be justified in order to
protect the integrity of a market society and are totally consistent with it.
At times, however, the collective nature of the decision to forbid behavior is more basic.
Criminal sanctions are used to prohibit consensual behavior (the fact that the victim was willing
does not exonerate the killer), or are used where negotiations are not feasible (where a pure
marketeer would accept a liability rule, but not a criminal sanction, as the necessary second best).
The societal decision in these cases is, typically, ideologically collective, because it attempts to
make some entitlements inalienable despite the desires of the immediate parties. See generally
Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3. Those who are devoted to pure market approaches and ideol-
ogies are, understandably, likely to chafe at criminal sanctions in such areas. In the consensual
cases, where negotiations between all the relevant parties are possible, the pure marketeer would
abolish all criminal penalties except those needed to enforce the requirement that such negotia-
tions take place. In the areas where negotiations are not feasible he would also decriminalize, but
would require, as a second best, that the injured parties be compensated by the injurers at a
collectively determined price.
If one views Becker et al. as ideologically committed pure marketeers, one can readily un-
derstand their desire to convert the sanctions in these last areas of criminal law to torts-like, liabil-
ity rule, sanctions. (One cannot, however, understand their desire to apply liability rules to crimes
where negotiations are feasible.) But to say that one can understandwhat they are about is very far
from saying that they are right from the society's point of view. A society that has chosen (wisely
or not) a rule of inalienability (a collective prohibition of some behavior) has rejected in that
instance the market ideology, and hence is not likely to be talked into accepting a torts-like sanc-
tion in lieu of a traditional criminal penalty merely because a liability rule would serve as the
market's feasible second best.
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the liability rule even when contractual behavior or collective prohibi-
tions are eminently feasible.
Torts, or the rule of liability, is currently used in many areas that
reflect the prevailing ideological skepticism. Skepticism toward pure
collectivism--even where collective judgments are feasible--can be
seen in all those areas where the fault standard prevails. In these areas
the initial entitlement (the right to act without bearing the burden of
the injuries one causes) is negated by the fact that the faulty party acted
in a way that was collectively judged to be undesirable-wrong.' 9 De-
spite this, the "undesirable" act is not forbidden, and criminal law even
if applied is not viewed as sufficient to control it. Rather, the actor
is-in effect-given the opportunity to second guess the collective de-
termination and to decide that acting in the faulty manner or taking the
chance of so acting, is worth the-collectively determined-damages
he must pay. In other words, the collective decision is subjected to an-
other, atomistic or market, review by the faulty party."0 This skepticism
toward collective judgments takes its most dramatic form in the accept-
ance of insurance for injuries caused by faulty behavior. Insurance is,
after all, essentially contractual behavior that permits the insured to
buy the right to risk injury to those entitled to be free from risk bearing.
19. For present purposes it does not matter whether the collective judgment was based solely
on an efficiency calculation or on broader grounds.
The initial entitlement to act without bearing the burden of the injuries can be given to the
victim or to the injurer. Letting the loss lie where it falls (unless the injurer is at fault) is an
example of injurer entitlement. Strict injurer liability (unless the victim is negligent) gives the
entitlement to the victim. See Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence andAccident, supra note 2; Calab-
resi & Hirschoff, supra note 2.
20. We can now begin to understand why writers like Richard Posner, who are devoted to a
market ideology, support a fault approach in torts law. Use of fault in lieu of a broader collective
prohibition (Le., the employment of a liability rule based on a collective determination that be-
havior is wrongful, instead of a criminal sanction) manifests deep skepticism toward collective
decisions, for a feasible (indeed an actual) collective determination of the merits of individual
behavior is not enforced criminally but instead is subjected to an atomistic, market review. This
skepticism, while it explains a reluctance to use criminal sanctions instead of fault, see note 18
supra; does not, of course, explain why, in the absence of fault, the pure marketeer prefers univer-
sal victim liability to universal injurer liability or, more plausibly, to strict non-fault liability some-
times on one and sometimes on the other party. That preference can, however, also be explained
once one understands the fact that liability rules are only a poor second best for the pure con-
tractarian-market ideologue, and that victim liability may render any non-contractual behavior
unnecessary. See text accompanying notes 8-11 supra & notes 21-22 infra. Such a preference may,
however, be quite costly from both an efficiency and a distributional point of view. Once again,
the difference between utilitarian and libertarian-contractarian approaches becomes crucial.
Compare R. POSNER, supra note 18; Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 205
(1973); andPosner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972), with G. CALABRESI, THE
COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 3; Calabresi, Optimal Deterrence andAccidents, supra note 2;
Calabresi, supra note 11; Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 2; and Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 3. See also notes 8, 10-11 supra.
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The contrast to the criminal sanctions that a "pure" collective society
would employ is both obvious and dramatic.
Similarly, torts today also reflects skepticism toward the pure mar-
ket even where contractual behavior-before action-is feasible. One
need only consider the restrictions commonly placed on exculpatory or
indemnificatory agreements, and the decline of the doctrine of assump-
tion of risk, to see how far from the "pure" market ideology we have
come.2' An equally significant sign of this skepticism, if one stops to
think about it, is the move away from entitlements that placed losses on
victims. These entitlements were favored by a pure market ideology
because they did not require that unfeasible contracts be made before
action could take place. The victim did not need to buy indemnity from
the risk of injury from all his potential injurers (who might be hard to
identify and pay); he could relatively easily find an insurance company
ready to take on the monetary risk. Therefore, the pure market society
tended to place risks of loss on the potential victim, unless such an
allocation was clearly unjust or inefficient or unless contractual behav-
ior by injurers was clearly feasible before action.22 The turn away from
this allocation inevitably suggests skepticism toward pure market ideol-
ogy. Moreover, even when the entitlement to be free of the risk is given
to the potential injurer, and the potential victim is burdened with the
risk, the victim is typically required to insure himself. We call this first
party insurance, but whatever its name, the requirement of insurance
represents a deep skepticism of pure market choices. We wish the bur-
den to lie on the victim, but we do not trust his atomistic judgment in
evaluating the entity of the burden or the desirability of risking it.
2 3
21. See, e.g., Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776 (N.D. Ind. 1969); McGrath v.
American Cyanamid Co., 41 N.J. 272, 196 A.2d 238 (1963); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors,
Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960). See also Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 2, at 1073 n.65;
note 16 supra.
22. Protection of property through criminal sanctions in pure market societies is readily ex-
plained by the feasibility of contractual behavior (purchase rather than theft) before injury, as well
as by the efficiency and distributional intuitions of such societies. See also Demsetz, supra note 8.
Similarly, injurer liability for at least some fault-caused injuries was generally justified in such
societies on efficiency grounds. See Richard Posner's writings cited at note 20 supra See also 0.
HOLMES, supra note 3. The same would be true, afortior for intentional or willful torts, where
the feasibility of contractual behavior, before the injury, cannot be excluded. Punitive damages
would seem particularly appropriate in such cases even in pure market societies. See note 18
supra.
23. Compulsory insurance for at least part of the loss is a common feature of all so-called no-
fault or first party automobile insurance plans currently being debated. The insurance is not
merely compulsory toward third parties to whom the motorist is held strictly liable (e.g., passen-
gers and pedestrians) but is also compulsory with respect to the motorist's own injuries. See, e.g.,
R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM (1965), from which
most such plans derive.
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The death of contract has taken many forms, not the least of which
has been the movement from a tort law designed to be the minimum
necessary to make a pure market feasible, to one that glories in its lim-
ited but not unavoidable collective interventions.
24
What does this suggest about the next hundred years? It is hard to
conceive of a return to the ideology of the pure market. Even the nine-
teenth century found too inflexible the notion that the best we can do
with respect to risks is to decide who seems to be able to avoid harm
most cheaply25 and make him act at his criminal peril should he harm
others, unless he can induce these others to take on the risks for a price.
Nor is it likely that we will return to the compromise with reality that
the laissezfaire period made-
(a) not to require contractual behavior but to allow actors,
who have been chosen to bear the risk and have not
shifted it contractually, to pay collectively determined
damages, and
(b) (in order to keep such collectively determined liability at
a minimum) to let the loss lie on the victim unless effi-
ciency and distributional imperatives required burden-
ing the injurer.
This minimal use of torts will remain unacceptable because it depends
too much on a willingness to believe that victims (1) are frequently the
cheapest avoiders of harms, or (2) are distributionally desirable loss
bearers, and, in addition, (3) can intelligently value the risk they are
bearing. The decline of faith in the first two propositions has led to
more "strict injurer" liability and hence to a greater use of torts and
liability rules on feasibility grounds, which must inevitably trouble the
24. See generally G. GiLMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT (1974).
One can, from this standpoint, usefully compare the various attempts made by courts to
distinguish between contracts limiting liability in the case of a toaster that is defective in the sense
that it fails to work and that of a toaster that is defective in the sense that it blows up or sets a
house on fire. The most common first try was, of course, in terms of property versus personal
damages. See, e.g., Justice Traynor's "defect causing damage to humans" test for strict liability,
Greenman v. Yuba Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Calif. Rptr. 697, (1963); Escola
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring).
But such an approach failed because the same society that is sufficiently laissez-faire to permit an
ordinary contract to determine who bears the risk of a toaster's failure to work (or of other rela-
tively frequent minor damages, whether personal or property) is not willing to permit major, rela-
tively rare victim-property damages (like those following on toaster caused fires) to be so
allocated. Where the law of sales ends and the law of torts begins, in other words, tells us a great
deal about the ideological makeup of the society, about how far from a pure market it has gone,
without, for all of that, becoming ideologically committed to collectivism.
25. This assumes that the pure market ideologue is concerned solely with efficiency and is
uninterested in the distributional consequences of the allocation of risks. In fact, it seems likely
that the initial entitlement always was based on distributional as well as on efficiency grounds.
See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 3; 0. HOLMES, supra note 3.
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true believers in the nineteenth century liberal state. (The defense of
ideologically second best positions, and the liability rule is always sec-
ond best to contractual behavior, rarely appeals to true believers.) The
decline of faith in the third proposition represents a direct assault on
the market ideology. Together they amount to.a skepticism that fore-
closes a return to a minimal law of torts-to a law of torts limited to
being the unavoidable adjunct to a contract based society.
But what of the other ideology? Will the next hundred years bring
the decline (if not the death) of torts and liability rules because there
will be no room left for the individualism torts implies? Will the liabil-
ity rule become that minimal concession that the collectivist state must
permit only because it cannot enforce an infinity of judgments collec-
tively? Will damage size increasingly come to depend on the relative
undesirability of the payor's behavior instead of on the best estimate of
what is needed to compensate for the harm caused?26 Will, and this is
the other side of the coin, compensation itself become increasingly cov-
ered out of general taxes? It is possible-for certainly the trend toward
greater collectivism in our society is still running strong.
Still, and this may perhaps reflect only my own ideological skepti-
cism, I am inclined to doubt that the trend will go that far. As in 1876
the tide is rising but may at the same time have started to recede. The
failure of regulation, as we know it, as a means of furthering safety is
too patent. The very advocates of more regulation, like Mr. Nader, base
their pleas on the failure of past "regulators," that is, .of regulation. The
corruptibility of the "allocating state," of the state that decides too
many things which affect too many people, becomes more manifest
every day.2 7 There is talk, even in societies committed to collectivism,
about the utility of incentives as means of enforcement and choice. At
the same time, in the United States the many experiments currently
being tried with class actions, pollution licenses or taxes (simply an-
other form of liability rule), reverse damages in nuisance suits, and
even civil self-enforcement against law violations, suggest an increasing
skepticism toward the pure collectivist mode of controlling risk and
harm.28
26. Punitive damages or fines, used in lieu ofcriminal law, do not, of course, represent a move
toward greater collectivism, quite the contrary. See note 18 supra. The same kind of damages and
fines employed in place of compensatory damages, in situations where torts was traditionally used
as a substitute for unfeasible contractual transactions, do represent a turning away from relatively
atomistic and individualized decisions and an increase in collective decision making.
27. This corruptibility is evident both in "Western" style democracies and in the "People's"
republics.
28. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev. Co., 108 Ariz. 178, 494 P.2d 700 (1972)
(the now classic case of reverse damages in nuisance); International Herald Tribune, June 3, 1976,
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Perhaps in this disillusionment with "pure regulation," hindsight
will be able to discern the beginning of a trend. It will not be a trend
toward the tort law of the nineteenth century. Nor-I suspect-will it
even be a trend toward that relatively individualistic, second best mar-
ket society that I have, at times, been charged with promoting. The
object will not be simply to place liability on the cheapest cost avoider,
taking into consideration distributional goals, and then to let atomistic
decisions determine the extent of safety and harm. Rather, if there is a
trend, it is a trend toward an ideologically self-conscious use of torts as a
mixed system. The possibilities inherent in the liability rule as a device
for promoting clearly collective goals and mitigating perceived inca-
pacities of people to decide best for themselves, while still permitting a
wide degree of atomistic choice and determination, under this view will
be fully exploited. If that is the case, if-as I believe it will-the mixed
society prevails, the next century will be the century not of contracts
nor of criminal law (though both will remain dominant in limited areas
as part of the ideological mixture)29 but of torts and of the rule of liabil-
ity.
at 3, col. 1, noting a proposed pollution tax that some United States economists and legislators
believe will be more effective than regulation. The proponents of the pollution tax emphasized the
administrative unworkability of regulation. An official of the National Association of Manufac-
turers, instead, defended regulation in a congressional seminar, saying, "It is working well and
should not be scrapped for an untried theoretical approach." Cf. Washington Post, Feb. 1, 1976, §
B, at 1, col. 6 (reporting the civil damage suit brought by a rape victim to buttress what were
viewed as inadequate criminal law controls in the area). See also the debate between Posner &
Landes and Stigler on the relative merits of "private law enforcement," Landes & Posner, The
Private Enforcement ofLaw, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. I (1975); Becker & Stigler, Law Enforcement, Mal-
feasance, and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1974).
29. If this view is correct, one can expect that there will be increasing tort-like influences in
areas where contracts and criminal law prevail. The concept of contracts of adhesion, for instance,
will continue to grow (thus limiting the pure market even in areas nominally governed by contract
law), as will the notion of compensation of victims of crimes (thus putting some market type
incentives at work in a traditionally collectivist area of law).
My colleague Leon Lipson has pointed out that a disproportionate number of American and
English jurisprudes, in the last century, began their careers in contracts law, while a disproportion-
ate number of Russian jurisprudes, since 1917, have been scholars of criminal law. It will be
interesting to see if the American legal philosophers of the next years will come from fields in
which liabili , rules, as I have here used the term, are dominant.
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